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The Alien Tort Statute ( the “ATS”) has been the subject of 
much curiosity ever since it became a conduit for human rights 
lawsuits nearly 40 years ago. Many of these lawsuits have been 
directed at corporate defendants, with businesses around the 
world accused of conscience-shocking behavior. However, the 
Supreme Court has in recent years restricted the scope of 
corporate ATS liability. In 2013, the Court held in Kiobel that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, 
and in 2018, it held in Jesner that foreign corporations cannot 
be sued under the ATS. In the wake of these developments, 
observers have questioned whether the statute’s vitality is 
reaching its end. 
This Note charts the path forward for the ATS. After 
tracing the development of the statute from its murky 
Founding origins to its modern incarnation as a powerful 
litigation tool, the Note examines how several circuits have 
analyzed the issues of corporate liability and the presumption 
against extraterritoriality under the ATS. The Note ultimately 
argues that the Fourth Circuit’s approach provides the best 
regime for the ATS in light of Jesner and the other 
considerations that have long informed ATS cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of lawsuits against companies resulting from 
their business operations is hardly a novel development. But 
in recent years, a class of disputes has arisen in response to 
international business activities that truly shock the 
conscience. To illustrate: In Indonesia, a prominent oil and 
gas giant allegedly aided the Indonesian military in 
murdering and torturing local villagers in order to protect the 
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company’s natural gas extraction and processing facility;1 in 
Colombia, a supranational coal company allegedly used a local 
paramilitary organization to carry out extrajudicial killings, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity in order to protect 
its local mining operation;2 and in Iraq, a military contractor 
allegedly helped torture Iraqi prisoners as part of the globally 
condemned Abu Ghraib prison scandal.3 
These are just several examples of lawsuits that have 
proceeded under the Alien Tort Statute (the “ATS”)4 against 
corporations. Once dormant for close to 200 years, the ATS 
(also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act) has been 
reinvigorated in the modern era. Foreign victims of egregious 
human rights abuses committed abroad5 have invoked the 
statute in order to sue the perpetrators of said abuses in U.S. 
federal courts. Like the suits referenced above, many of the 
most high-profile of these cases involve corporate defendants. 
The prospect of businesses engaging in the type of appalling 
behavior that the ATS contemplates attracts significant 
public attention, as does the controversial fact that some cases 
have involved a foreign plaintiff suing a foreign corporation 
over extraterritorial conduct. These developments render the 
ATS an intriguing subject. This is especially true because the 
ATS stands at the intersection of business and human rights, 
a rapidly growing legal field of study.6 
However, the last decade has seen significant pushback on 
the idea that corporations are liable under the ATS. First, the 
 
1 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
2 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2008). 
3 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 
2014).  
4 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
5 While the ATS does not require that the underlying tort be committed 
abroad, it appears that there has been no modern ATS case involving only 
domestic tortious conduct. See Gregory H. Fox & Yunjoo Goze, International 
Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, MICH. B. J., Nov. 2013, at 45 (2013) 
(describing two classes of modern ATS cases, both of which involve at least 
some extraterritorial conduct).  
6 See Jena Martin, Business and Human Rights: What’s the Board Got 
to Do with It?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 977 (2013). 
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Second Circuit held in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS.7 The 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari for that case was supposed 
to decide whether corporations categorically were or were not 
liable under the ATS, but the Court instead held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS.8 
This led several circuits to constrain the conditions under 
which plaintiffs could sue corporations. Then, in 2018, the 
Supreme Court again took up the issue of corporate ATS 
liability in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, only to again avoid 
making a categorical ruling on general corporate liability. 
Instead, the Court held that foreign corporations were not 
liable under the ATS.9 While Jesner implicitly recognized that 
U.S. corporations could continue to be sued in those circuits 
that recognize corporate liability, the overall effect of these 
holdings has been to significantly narrow the scope of 
corporate liability. With circuits differing on the issues of 
corporate liability and the conditions necessary to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to 
corporations, the present and future of U.S. corporations’ ATS 
liability is uncertain. 
This Note argues that U.S. corporations should be 
recognized as liable under the ATS and that the Fourth 
Circuit offers the most appropriate analytical framework to 
evaluate corporate ATS liability going forward. The Fourth 
Circuit’s approach best addresses the ATS’s presumption 
against exterritoriality and the concerns voiced by Jesner 
while simultaneously holding U.S. corporations accountable 
for their complicity in inflicting human rights abuses. Given 
 
7 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
8 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013). The 
presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction 
whereby it is assumed that federal legislation does not reach extraterritorial 
conduct, unless it is clear that Congress intended otherwise. Morrison v. 
Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
9 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (reasoning 
that foreign corporations being ATS defendants implicates unacceptable 
foreign relations problems for courts).  
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the prevalence of ATS cases involving corporate defendants, 
this accountability fulfills a vital need. Part II traces the 
history of the ATS, from its origins in the late 18th century to 
the modern proliferation of lawsuits filed against corporations 
for human rights abuses, focusing most heavily on the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Kiobel and Jesner. Part III 
examines the approaches that the Second Circuit, the Fourth 
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the D.C. 
Circuit have taken to address the issues of corporate ATS 
liability and the conditions necessary to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. While the circuits’ 
decisions predate the Supreme Court’s Jesner decision, and 
some even predate the Court’s Kiobel opinion, their analyses 
remain salient for addressing U.S. corporate liability. 
Additionally, it is necessary to consider both corporate 
liability generally and the somewhat distinct issue of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality because the two 
issues are now linked under the ATS after Kiobel and Jesner. 
Part IV explains why U.S. corporations should continue to be 
liable under the ATS despite the judicial caution urged by 
Kiobel and Jesner, and why the Supreme Court should adopt 
the Fourth Circuit’s approach. Part V offers brief concluding 
thoughts on the future of the ATS. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE ATS 
A. The ATS’s Enactment and Dormancy 
The ATS was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.10 It currently reads: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”11 Because of a dearth of 
contemporaneous sources explaining the provision’s purposes, 
and because the statute was rarely invoked until the modern 
 
10 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)). 
11 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
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era, there is no definitive account of what motivated the First 
Congress to pass the statute and what offenses it 
contemplated. This has rendered the ATS an “an oft-discussed 
but little understood” law.12 However, history does provide 
some clues. The statute’s enactment came in the wake of the 
Articles of Confederation era, a time that saw a rise in 
international tensions between the burgeoning United States 
and foreign powers, particularly Great Britain.13 These 
tensions were largely a result of the failure of states to provide 
appropriate redress for violations of the law of nations 
committed by them and their citizens against the citizens of 
foreign powers.14  
Under the law of nations as it existed at that time, a 
nation-state had an affirmative obligation to provide redress 
for certain harms that its citizens inflicted on citizens of 
another nation-state.15 If the state failed to provide redress, it 
became responsible for those harms, and the state which the 
victim belonged to could have just cause for reprisals, possibly 
including war.16 Critically, the mere intentional infliction of 
injury upon another’s person or property sufficed to violate the 
law of nations.17 This meant that the Articles-era United 
States could have been deemed responsible every time one of 
its states refused to provide redress for an intentional tort, or 
any other law of nations violation, suffered by an alien. Again, 
states were indeed inflaming international tensions in this 
way.18 For a young nation coming off an expensive war for 
independence, this threat compounded the nation’s precarious 
 
12 Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 831 (2006). 
13 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute 
and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 466 (2011). 
14 Id. 
15 STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44947, THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE (ATS): A PRIMER 4 (2018), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44947 
[https://perma.cc/E584-X8U8].  
16 Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 476. 
17 Id. at 448. 
18 Id. at 466. 
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position.19 However, allowing for a civil tort remedy was an 
accepted means of providing redress for these violations,20 
meaning that the United States could discharge its law of 
nations obligations and avoid opening itself to foreign 
retaliation by creating such a remedy.  
In light of these circumstances, it is natural that the First 
Congress would want to include such a civil tort provision in 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created the federal judiciary. 
As such, “the ATS is best understood as a self-executing, fail-
safe measure that enabled the United States to avoid 
responsibility for law of nations violations by permitting 
aliens to sue US [sic] citizens for intentional torts in federal 
court.”21 The ATS filled a critical gap in the Judiciary Act. 
Without it, the Act permitted aliens to sue U.S. citizens in 
federal court only if the amount in controversy exceeded 
$500.22 Since most intentional tort claims did not meet this 
requirement, many intentional torts committed by U.S. 
citizens23 against aliens would potentially go unredressed if 
the ATS did not exist, meaning the United States would 
potentially be responsible for many law of nations violations. 
The ATS meant to ensure that this would not be the case.24 
 
19 See id. at 501–07 (describing states’ insufficient attempts to provide 
redress for violations of foreign citizens’ rights inflicted by their citizens and 
contemporaneous observers’ concerns about the possible repercussions of 
the inadequacy of these attempts). 
20 See id. at 483. 
21 Id. at 454. 
22 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)). 
23 As indicated supra, at the time of its adoption, the ATS likely 
contemplated only defendants that were U.S. nationals, since a nation could 
not be deemed responsible for the acts of non-nationals. Yet in the ATS’s 
modern application, many suits have involved non-U.S. defendants, and the 
disconnect between that fact and the ATS’s original understanding is a 
significant reason for the controversy surrounding the statute’s use. But 
this also means, as discussed infra, that the ATS’s original understanding 
does comport with U.S. corporations being liable under the statute going 
forward. 
24 Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 450. 
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Despite the vital role it played, the ATS was rarely invoked 
between 1789 and 1980. District courts upheld jurisdiction 
under the ATS only twice in that period,25 and rejected 
jurisdiction under it on about a dozen occasions.26 In other 
words, the statute was “essentially dormant” for nearly two 
hundred years.27 This is not altogether surprising given 
several factors that limited the applicability of the ATS: first, 
while the ATS as originally understood likely did cover 
intentional torts committed abroad by U.S. citizens against 
aliens, in the initial period after the ATS’s enactment it would 
have been exceedingly difficult for an alien in such a situation 
to sue in U.S. federal court due to the difficulty of travel at 
that time; second, aliens who suffered harm in the United 
States often simply left the country instead of pursuing civil 
remedies; and third, tensions between the United States and 
Great Britain soon dissipated, meaning British aliens were far 
less likely to be victims of intentional torts, especially since 
loyalists were increasingly likely to assimilate into U.S. 
citizenship.28 These developments served to remove a large 
category of possible plaintiffs from ATS suits.29  
While the lack of ATS cases means that courts never 
addressed the possibility of corporate liability, there is reason 
to believe that corporations were indeed liable under the ATS 
from its beginning. First, the text of the statute, while 
expressly specifying what type of plaintiff could sue under it, 
did not distinguish among possible defendants.30 Second, the 
legal status of corporations in the late 18th century supports 
this proposition. Indeed, in a recent decision a D.C. Circuit 
panel noted that: 
 
25 Alicia Pitts, Comment, Avoiding the Alien Tort Statute: A Call for 
Uniformity in State Court Human Rights Litigation, 71 SMU L. REV. 1209, 
1212 (2018) (citing the discussion of the ATS’ history in Bolchos v. Darrel, 
3. F.Cas 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607)). 
26 Lee, supra note 12, at 832–33 n.6. 
27 Id. at 832. 
28 Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 525. 
29 Id. 
30 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)). 
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[B]y 1789 corporate liability in tort was an accepted 
principle of tort law in the United States . . . . Thus it 
appears that the law in 1789 on corporate liability was 
the same as it is today: ‘The general rule of 
substantive law is that corporations, like individuals, 
are liable for their torts.31  
Under the law of nations, states were responsible for the 
violations of their private citizens,32 and this historical context 
gives reason to believe that their responsibility extended to 
their corporate citizens.  
B. The ATS’s Reawakening 
After the ATS had lain dormant for nearly 200 years, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals resuscitated the statute in 
1980 with its decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. There, 
Paraguayan citizens Joel and Dolly Filartiga sued Americo 
Norberto Pena-Irala, also a Paraguayan citizen, for wrongful 
death, alleging that Pena-Irala had tortured their family 
member to death in Paraguay when Pena-Irala was serving 
as a local police official.33 The court held there that state-
sponsored torture violated a newly-recognized norm of 
international human rights law and it thus constituted a 
violation of the law of nations under the ATS.34 This finding 
allowed the court to exercise jurisdiction over the Filartigas’ 
claims. 
The court made clear that it had to examine international 
law based on how it had evolved, and not how it existed at the 
time of the ATS’s enactment.35 In order for an international 
law norm to become binding among all nations, the norm must 
 
31 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing White v. Cent. Dispensary & 
Emergency Hosp., 99 F.2d 355, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1938)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
32 Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 478. 
33 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). The dispute 
can be categorized as “foreign-cubed,” meaning it involved a foreign 
plaintiff(s), a foreign defendant, and conduct occurring in a foreign country. 
34 Id. at 880. 
35 Id. at 881. 
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command the “general assent of civilized nations.”36 Torture 
had gained this status in the court’s view because it found that 
international agreements evinced a “universal condemnation” 
of the practice.37 Interestingly, in closing its opinion, the court 
referred to the most infamous law of nations violators known 
in the late 18th century, declaring that “the torturer has 
become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis 
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”38 This one 
sentence well illustrates the leap from the cloudy origins of 
the ATS to its sudden invocation as a tool for fighting human 
rights abuses in U.S. federal courts. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga spawned a wave 
of litigation.39 Increasingly, beginning in the mid-1990s, 
corporations became the focus of this litigation.40 Human 
rights advocates sued multinationals for their alleged 
complicity in abuses committed abroad as a result of 
businesses’ joint projects with host governments.41 Naturally, 
corporations pushed back against this development, arguing 
that plaintiffs should not be allowed to use the ATS to assert 
jurisdiction over corporations and hold them liable for abuses 
occurring abroad.42  
 
36 Id. at 881. 
37 Id. at 880. 
38 Id. at 890. 
39 Joel Slawotsky, Are Financial Institutions Liable for Financial 
Crime Under the Alien Tort Statute?, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 981 (2013). 
40 Fox & Goze, supra note 5, at 45. 
41 Lee, supra note 12, at 841. 
42 Martin, supra note 6, at 961. Businesses have mainly utilized the 
arguments that international law should control the question of corporate 
liability (as it stands, corporate liability is not sufficiently recognized in 
international law) and that the ATS should not reach extraterritorial 
conduct. For a discussion of the former, see generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); for a 
discussion of the latter, see generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
569 U.S. 108 (2013).  
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C. The Supreme Court and the ATS 
The Supreme Court finally weighed in on the ATS, albeit 
not on the issue of corporate liability, in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain. Disparate liability regimes developed in the wake of 
this ruling, reflecting its status as “not a model of clarity.”43 
Nevertheless, the Court advanced several key principles 
regarding the ATS.  
First, the Court held that the ATS is purely a jurisdictional 
statute and does not create any new causes of action.44 At the 
same time, the Court recognized that the First Congress did 
not intend the ATS to be a dead letter, and it enacted the 
statute with the understanding that causes of action would be 
derived from the common law for “the modest number of 
international law violations” that could have resulted in 
personal liability in the late 18th century.45 Second, the Court 
“found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples [of 
torts] in mind” other than a narrow set identified by William 
Blackstone: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.46 As such, courts were to 
continue exercising jurisdiction under the ATS, but only when 
claims involved an alleged violation that rested on an 
international law norm “accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of”47 the 
three aforementioned torts.48 Finally, the Court expressly 
 
43 Bellia, Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 458. 
44 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 725. While the Court did not provide precise guidance for how 
to determine whether a norm had become sufficiently accepted and 
specifically defined, it did indicate that, in conducting such an examination, 
courts should consult treaties, international agreements, nations’ practices 
and customs, and the works of scholars and commentators (insofar as they 
explain the present state of international law). Id. at 733–34 (citing The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
48 Id. at 734. As discussed supra, there is evidence to suggest that the 
First Congress had a far wider range of law of nations violations in mind 
when it passed the ATS, since any intentional tort to the person or property 
of an alien would amount to such a violation and render the United States 
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instructed lower courts to be cautious in recognizing ATS 
claims for the following reasons: the conception of the common 
law had changed drastically since 1789, in a way that called 
for judges to be restrained in their discretionary power; the 
federal “general” common law no longer existed; the 
legislature was better equipped to create private rights of 
action than courts; the possibility of adverse foreign policy and 
foreign relations consequences; and the lack of a congressional 
mandate to define new law of nations violations.49 
 The Sosa Court’s brief reference to corporate liability 
became particularly controversial. In footnote 20 of the 
decision, the Court stated that, in determining whether an 
international law norm had become sufficiently accepted so as 
to support ATS jurisdiction, “[a] related consideration is 
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a 
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.”50 This footnote spawned two widely variant 
interpretations. Under one interpretation, the court was 
distinguishing between international law offenses that 
require state action and those that do not, implying that any 
private actor in the latter group, including a corporation, 
would be capable of committing an offense. Under the other 
interpretation, the court was distinguishing between 
corporations and individuals in the larger category of private 
actors. Under this reading, certain offenses could not be 
committed by corporations under international law and it is 
up to courts to determine that issue for any given offense.51 In 
other words, under the former interpretation, corporations are 
cognizable offenders of any norm that does not require state 
action. Under the latter interpretation, corporations might 
not be cognizable offenders of a norm that does not require 
 
responsible for it unless the country provided redress. Bellia, Jr. & Clark, 
supra note 13, at 517–518. But see Lee, supra note 12, at 836 (arguing that 
the ATS was enacted to cover only violations of safe conducts, and not to 
redress piracy or infringements of ambassadorial rights). 
49 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28. 
50 Id. at 732 n.20 (emphasis added). 
51 See discussion infra Section II.D. 
6_2019.3_ESTES (DO NOT DELETE) 12/26/2019  12:00 AM 
No. 3:1031] MAY THE FOURTH BE WITH YOU 1043 
state action even if private individuals are cognizable 
offenders. 
In the years before Sosa, courts recognized multiple 
modern-day international law violations to be actionable 
under the ATS, including genocide, slave trading, slavery, 
forced labor, war crimes, and torture.52 Of these, only torture 
required state action on the part of the defendant in order to 
be actionable.53 In 2013, thirty-three years after Filartiga and 
nine years after Sosa, the Supreme Court finally took on the 
issue of corporate ATS liability. 
D. The ATS and Corporations: A Narrowing of the 
Scope of Liability 
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”), the 
Second Circuit held that corporations categorically cannot be 
liable under the ATS.54 This created a circuit split, as every 
other circuit court of appeals that had considered the issue 
had, explicitly or implicitly, ruled that corporations could be 
held liable under the ATS.55 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in response to Kiobel I to answer the question of 
whether corporations could be liable under the ATS (“Kiobel 
II”),56 providing hope that the Court would resolve the circuit 
split. However, after oral argument, the Court instructed the 
 
52 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS 253 (2006). 
53 Id. Torture could also be actionable in the absence of state action if 
it was committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes. Id. Congress spoke 
directly to the point of torture in its enactment of the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). This led to 
questions about whether torture remained actionable under the ATS or if 
the TVPA preempted any such claims, but the TVPA’s legislative history 
supports the proposition that Congress intended it to supplement the ATS. 
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 138 (2013). 
54 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
55 MULLIGAN, supra note 15, at 18. 
56 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114. 
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parties to brief the question of “[w]hether and under what 
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”57 
Ultimately, the Court ruled on the basis of that question, 
holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to ATS claims and that nothing in the ATS rebuts this 
presumption.58 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of 
construction whereby it is assumed that federal legislation 
only applies domestically and does not reach extraterritorial 
conduct, unless it is clear that Congress intended otherwise.59 
In the words of the Supreme Court, the canon demands that 
if a statute “gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”60 While the underlying principle has 
long existed,61 the Supreme Court has invoked the canon with 
increasing frequency over the past thirty years.62 As applied 
 
57 Id. (alteration in original). 
58 Id. at 124. 
59 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
60 Id. 
61 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) 
(“[Various] considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of 
any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the 
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate 
power.”). 
62 Note, Clarifying Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1902, 1906 (2017). Relatedly, the Court has increasingly limited the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law through a series of cases over 
the past 15 years, which includes Kiobel II. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. 
v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 (2004) (holding that U.S. antitrust 
law does not apply to foreign price-fixing activity where foreign injuries are 
independent of any domestic injuries); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266–67 
(rejecting extraterritorial application of a federal securities statute because 
the statute’s “focus” centered on domestic conduct); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (introducing two-prong 
test for allowing application of U.S. law when foreign conduct is involved). 
Morrison has led to courts in some contexts applying a “focus” test in 
deciding whether extraterritorial application of U.S. law is proper by 
examining whether a statute’s “focus” is on exterritorial conduct or domestic 
conduct. See, e.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).  
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by the Court in Kiobel II, the presumption meant that, in 
order for plaintiffs to successfully obtain jurisdiction under 
the ATS, they would have to show that their claims touched 
and concerned the territory of the United States with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption,63 thereby 
announcing the new “touch and concern” test in the ATS 
context.64 As far as corporate liability, the only principle the 
Kiobel II Court announced was “that “mere corporate 
presence” does not suffice to rebut the presumption.65 
In holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to the ATS, the majority based its reasoning on the 
original understanding of the ATS and the way in which the 
Court had previously interpreted that understanding in 
Sosa.66 As the Sosa court had focused on the three 
contemporaneous law of nations violations identified by 
Blackstone, the Kiobel II Court also relied heavily on those 
violations, finding that they contemplated conduct occurring 
solely in the United States.67 Although piracy, one of 
Blackstone’s identified violations, involved conduct occurring 
outside of the United States, pirates “were fair game wherever 
found,” meaning that exercising jurisdiction over piracy-
related claims did not raise much potential for foreign 
relations conflicts.68 Finally, the Court pointed out that the 
First Congress enacted the ATS with a view to reducing 
conflicts with foreign powers. The majority opined that 
extraterritorial application of the ATS would have the 
opposite effect, since it would potentially infringe on other 
nations’ sovereignty and cause other nations to react by haling 
 
63 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–25. 
64 The Court did not provide guidance for how courts should apply the 
“touch and concern” test in future cases, which left courts to develop their 
own methodologies, as discussed infra Part III. 
65 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125. 
66 Id. at 116–17 (discussing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004)).  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 119–22. 
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U.S. citizens into their courts for violations occurring in the 
United States.69 
Given the facts before it, the Court affirmed the Second 
Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims in finding that the 
claims did not touch and concern the United States with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption and warrant 
jurisdiction.70 None of the parties in the case were U.S. 
nationals. The plaintiffs were Nigerian nationals and had 
sued a Dutch holding company, an English holding company, 
and their joint subsidiary, a Nigerian corporation involved in 
oil production in Nigeria. The defendants allegedly aided and 
abetted the Nigerian military and police forces in their 
commission of extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, 
and torture, among other law of nations violations, in 
response to local residents protesting the environmental 
effects of the Nigerian subsidiary’s oil activities.71 All alleged 
conduct occurred outside the United States, and the 
defendants’ only connection to the United States was their 
listing on the New York Stock Exchange and their 
maintaining an affiliated office in New York whose sole 
purpose was to explain the defendants’ business to investors.72 
In these circumstances, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality prevented the exercise of ATS jurisdiction. 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in which he 
stated that, guided by international law principles, he would 
have courts exercise ATS jurisdiction when (1) the alleged law 
of nations violation occurred in the United States, (2) the 
defendant was a U.S. national, or (3) the alleged conduct 
“substantially and adversely” affected an important U.S. 
interest, including an interest “in preventing the United 
States from becoming a safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other 
common enemy of mankind.”73 However, Justice Breyer 
 
69 Id. at 124. 
70 Id. at 124–25. 
71 Id. at 111–14. 
72 Id. at 139–40 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
73 Id. at 127. 
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concurred in the judgment because the facts of the case met 
none of those three conditions.74 
While Kiobel II announced a novel standard for courts in 
evaluating ATS claims, the Court offered no real guidance as 
to how to conduct the new “touch and concern” test, and it only 
addressed corporate liability by stating that corporate 
presence alone is not enough to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. This led to district courts and courts of 
appeals applying the touch and concern test in myriad ways 
in the ensuing years.75 The issue of corporate liability also 
remained unsettled, though by refusing to rule on the issue, 
the Court implicitly indicated that, at least for the time being, 
corporations could be liable under the ATS (except in the 
Second Circuit).  
2. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
The Court once again granted certiorari on the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATS only five years later in 
Jesner. There, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant bank 
maintained accounts in the Middle East for terrorists and 
helped to compensate the family members of suicide bombers, 
thus aiding and abetting the injuries, killings, and captures 
inflicted by terrorists on the plaintiffs.76 As far as a nexus to 
the United States, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
used its New York branch to clear dollar-denominated 
transactions that benefited terrorists, and that the defendant 
also used that branch to transfer funds from a Texas-based 
charity to the accounts of terrorist-affiliated charities in the 
Middle East.77 
Writing for a 5–4 plurality, Justice Kennedy framed the 
issue as “whether common-law liability under the ATS 
 
74 Id. at 139–40. 
75 Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining 
Balancing Factors from Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 66 HASTINGS 
L.J. 443, 455–56 (2015). 
76 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018). 
77 Id. at 1394–95. 
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extends to a foreign corporate defendant”,78 rather than 
addressing the issue of corporate liability generally. Justice 
Kennedy characterized Sosa as mandating a two-question 
test: (1) whether the allegedly-violated international law 
norm is sufficiently “specific, universal, and obligatory,” and 
(2) whether judicial caution mandates dismissal in the 
absence of authorization by the political branches.79 The 
second question ultimately proved determinative, as the 
Court held that foreign corporations could not be defendants 
under the ATS due to foreign policy concerns.80 The plurality 
echoed the concern of Kiobel II that holding otherwise could 
result in other nations haling U.S. corporations into their 
courts for law of nations violations. It stated that “the 
cautionary language of Sosa would be little more than empty 
rhetoric” if foreign corporations faced ATS liability.81 Under 
this view, imposing ATS liability on foreign corporations could 
result in significant international friction with the 
corporations’ home nations, reinforcing the need for courts to 
defer to the political branches in the area of foreign relations, 
since that is traditionally not the judiciary’s province.82 
Justice Kennedy reached the second Sosa question because 
there was “sufficient doubt” on the first question to merit 
doing so, but in his discussion of the first question, he seemed 
to indicate that he sided with Kiobel I (though this part of the 
opinion did not carry a majority of the Court).83 In Kiobel I, 
writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Cabranes interpreted 
international law and Sosa’s footnote 20 to mean that 
corporate ATS liability could only exist if corporate liability 
for human rights violations was itself a universally recognized 
norm of international law.84 Justice Kennedy did not decide 
 
78 Id. at 1398 (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 1399 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id. at 1407. 
81 Id. at 1405–07. 
82 Id. at 1406. 
83 Id. at 1399–1402. 
84 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
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the issue, and he acknowledged the “considerable force and 
weight” behind the position taken by Judge Leval’s 
concurrence in Kiobel I. There, Judge Leval argued that 
international law only governed the substance of its violations 
and left the questions of remedies and enforcement—
including whether corporations could be liable for said 
violations—to nations themselves.85 However, Justice 
Kennedy went on to rely heavily on the same arguments and 
sources that Judge Cabranes used in Kiobel I.86 Justice 
Kennedy even expressly stated that “[i]t does not follow . . . 
that current principles of international law extend liability—
civil or criminal—for human-rights violations to corporations 
or other artificial entities.”87 
It seems, then, that Justice Kennedy believed that in order 
for corporate liability to exist under the ATS, that liability, 
and not just the underlying substantive offense, must 
represent a universally accepted international law norm. 
Since that is currently not the case, corporations should not 
be liable under the ATS, in Justice Kennedy’s view.88 In a 
forceful dissent, Justice Sotomayor adopted a similar position 
to Judge Leval’s, arguing that the plurality “fundamentally 
misconceive[d] how international law works” and thus 
incorrectly analyzed the first Sosa question, since 
international consensus was only required for the relevant 
substantive conduct and not the “mechanisms of 
enforcement.”89 In responding to the plurality’s deference to 
the political branches in light of foreign policy concerns, 
Justice Sotomayor pointed to the Executive Branch’s 
submission of briefs arguing in favor of corporate liability in 
the present case and Kiobel II, as well as Congress’s failure to 
 
85 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1396 (discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)).  
86 Id. at 1400–02. 
87 Id. at 1400. 
88 While it is unclear if corporate liability has attained the status of a 
universally accepted international law norm, there is a growing movement 
toward recognizing corporate liability on an international level, at least as 
it regards human rights violations. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
89 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1419–20 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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amend the ATS despite scores of corporations being sued 
under it since Filartiga.90 In closing, Justice Sotomayor 
referenced the ATS’s original purpose, stating that the Court’s 
decision “undermines the system of accountability for law-of-
nations violations that the First Congress endeavored to 
impose.”91 
 After Jesner, foreign corporations can no longer be sued 
under the ATS, removing “foreign-cubed” cases92 from the 
statute’s ambit. This led some observers to wonder whether 
the ATS would still be a viable tool going forward for victims 
of human rights abuses suffered at the hands of 
corporations.93 But the Supreme Court still has not 
affirmatively stated whether U.S. corporations are or are not 
liable under the ATS. Nor has the Court addressed how lower 
courts should conduct the “touch and concern” test for 
rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
whether for corporate defendants or non-corporate 
defendants. The circuits have reacted to these issues in 
various ways. The most notable examples are discussed below. 
III. CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO ATS CORPORATE 
LIABILITY AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Five circuits have developed noteworthy jurisprudence 
surrounding the ATS, corporate liability, and the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Their approaches to these 
jurisdictional issues range from the most restrictive (Second 
Circuit) to the least restrictive (Fourth Circuit). In the Second 
Circuit, corporations are categorially not liable under the 
 
90 Id. at 1431–32. 
91 Id. at 1437. 
92 Recall the definition of a “foreign-cubed” case in n.33. While the term 
was originally defined in a securities context, ATS cases provide an apt 
analogy. See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283 n.11 
(2010) (Breyer, J., concurring). Of course, since ATS plaintiffs must be 
aliens, there will always be at least one “f” in ATS cases. 
93 See, e.g., Samuel Moyn, Time to Pivot? Thoughts on Jesner v. Arab 
Bank, LAWFARE INST. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/time-
pivot-thoughts-jesner-v-arab-bank [https://perma.cc/C5JL-9978].  
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ATS, and for a plaintiff to rebut the presumption in a suit 
against a natural person, the alleged law of nations violation 
must have occurred on U.S. soil.94 Conversely, corporations 
can be liable under the ATS in the other circuits. In the Fourth 
Circuit, there has been little analysis regarding corporate 
liability, and courts have employed a relatively flexible, fact-
based analysis for rebutting the presumption.95 The Ninth 
Circuit has adopted a unique, offense-by-offense methodology 
for corporate liability and a semi-restrictive approach for 
rebutting the presumption, whereby at least some of the 
conduct relevant to a claim must have occurred in the United 
States.96 The Eleventh Circuit has also taken a semi-
restrictive approach for the presumption, which involves a 
two-part “U.S. focus” and conduct analysis, albeit with a 
greater emphasis on the latter.97 In the D.C. Circuit, 
corporations have been held categorically liable under the 
ATS. While the circuit’s jurisprudence surrounding the 
presumption remains somewhat unclear, it seems to be less 
restrictive than most of the other circuits. 98 However, a recent 
district court decision has clouded these issues.99 Thus, it 
appears so far that Jesner has not significantly affected any 
circuit’s ATS regime as applied to U.S. corporate defendants. 
Each circuit’s approach is examined in greater detail below.  
A. Second Circuit: Categorically Against Corporate 
Liability 
The Second Circuit is the lone circuit to hold that 
corporations are categorically not liable under the ATS. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this position in 
Kiobel I in 2010.100 Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority, 
 
94 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
95 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
96 See discussion infra Section III.C. 
97 See discussion infra Section III.D. 
98 See discussion infra Section III.E. 
99 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2019). 
100 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148–49 (2d Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
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largely based his decision on his interpretation of footnote 20 
in the Sosa decision.101 In his view, in order for corporations 
to be liable under the ATS, international law must recognize 
corporate liability.102 In other words, the availability of 
general corporate liability has to represent a specific, 
universal, and obligatory norm.103 If corporate liability for 
violations of international law has not attained near complete 
acceptance among civilized nations, corporations could not 
face ATS liability. 
 Judge Cabranes indeed concluded that corporate liability 
had “not attained a discernible, much less universal, 
acceptance” internationally after surveying a number of 
international tribunals, treaties, and scholarly works, such as 
the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunals and the 
International Criminal Court.104 Judge Cabranes also 
carefully pointed out that the fact that a norm existing in the 
domestic law of nearly all nations was not dispositive. That is, 
to be part of customary international law, the norm had to be 
one of true international concern.105 Finally, while Judge 
Cabranes acknowledged that international law allows 
 
101 Id. at 128 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 
(2004)). Footnote 20 itself reads that “A related consideration is whether 
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given 
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such 
as a corporation or individual.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 
n.20 (2004). 
102 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128–29. 
103 Id. at 131 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 See id. at 132–45. The Nuremberg Tribunals had jurisdiction only 
over natural persons, even though corporations were implicated in 
wrongdoing in connection with the Nazi regime. Id. at 133–34. For a 
discussion of why Judge Cabranes’s evaluation of what the Nuremberg 
Tribunals stand for in international law jurisprudence may be incorrect, see 
Jonathan Kolieb, Through the Looking-Glass: Nuremberg’s Confusing 
Legacy on Corporate Accountability Under International Law, 32 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 569, 578–80 (2017). More recently, the International Criminal 
Court, whose charter was passed in 1998, was also granted jurisdiction only 
over natural persons, and a proposal to include jurisdiction over 
corporations was expressly rejected. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136–37. 
105 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118. 
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individual states to determine remedies for violations, he 
emphasized that the question of liability for a class of 
defendants—here, corporations—is not a remedial 
question.106 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Leval sharply disagreed 
with the majority on nearly all fronts. Most importantly, he 
interpreted Sosa’s footnote 20 differently than Judge 
Cabranes.107  In his view, rather than drawing a distinction 
between individuals and corporations, the footnote drew a 
distinction between state actors and private actors.108 In 
examining a certain offense, courts had to determine if it was 
one that international law would apply only against states, or 
against both states and private actors. If the latter was true, 
then individuals and corporations would be liable; the two 
categories of private defendant would be treated the same 
under the ATS, not differently.109 Further, Judge Leval stated 
that “international law “takes no position” on whether civil 
liability should exist for violations of its norms and leaves that 
question up to the domestic law of individual states. For its 
part, the United States spoke on that question by enacting the 
ATS, and since corporations are liable for tort generally under 
U.S. domestic law, they should be similarly liable under the 
ATS.110  
Judge Leval further attacked the majority’s argument by 
discussing the relation of corporate liability to the liability of 
natural persons. The majority’s reasoning implied that 
international law needs to recognize human rights civil 
liability for natural persons as a universally accepted norm in 
order for natural persons to be liable under the ATS. Although 
no such universally accepted norm then existed, Second 
Circuit precedent nevertheless expressly recognized ATS 
 
106 Id. at 147–48. 
107 Judge Leval agreed that the complaint should be dismissed, but 
only because it failed to satisfy the pleading standard for aiding and 
abetting liability. Id. at 188 (Leval, J., concurring). 
108 Id. at 165. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 152. 
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liability for natural persons.111 Judge Leval also criticized the 
majority’s examination of international criminal tribunals. 
Judge Leval argued that such criminal tribunals did not cover 
corporations because imposing criminal liability on 
corporations, which are “fictitious juridical entit[ies],” could 
not serve the punitive objectives of criminal punishment, 
whereas imposing civil liability on corporations did serve the 
objectives of civil liability.112 For this reason, criminal 
tribunals’ lack of criminal prosecution said nothing about the 
potential for corporations’ civil liability.113 Judge Leval’s 
overall position is summed up thusly: 
Because the law of nations leaves each nation free to 
determine for itself whether to impose civil liability for 
such violations of the norms of the law of nations, and 
because the United States by enacting the ATS has 
opted for civil tort liability, U.S. courts, as a matter of 
U.S. law, entertain suits for compensatory damages 
under the ATS for violations of the law of nations. The 
ATS confers jurisdiction by virtue of the 
defendant’s violation of the law of nations. Damages 
are properly awarded under the ATS not because any 
rule of international law imposes damages, but 
because the United States has exercised the option left 
to it by international law to allow civil suits. Nothing 
in international law bars such an award . . . .114 
The Second Circuit has indicated that it is open to 
rethinking its position on corporate liability, due to its status 
as the only circuit that forecloses corporate liability, and 
Kiobel II’s implicit acknowledgement that corporations could 
be liable under the ATS. In In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort 
Statute Litigation, the precursor to Jesner, the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that its decision in Kiobel I holding both foreign 
 
111 Id. at 152–53. 
112 Id. at 152, 170. 
113 Id. at 170–72. 
114 Id. at 183–84. 
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and U.S. corporations immune from ATS suits “now appears 
to swim alone against the tide.”115 
In addition to foreclosing corporate liability, the Second 
Circuit has taken a restrictive approach to displacing the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to the ATS. 
This was first seen in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp.116 There, the 
plaintiffs accused defendants Chevron and BNP Paribas of 
aiding and abetting the torture of Iraqi citizens under Saddam 
Hussein’s regime by knowingly helping to provide illicit 
payments to Iraq in exchange for oil.117 Writing for the 
majority, Judge Cabranes emphasized that a court’s inquiry 
must concentrate on the defendant’s relevant conduct, which 
translates to an evaluation of the sufficiency of a case’s 
“domestic contacts.”118 The court took guidance from 
Morrison119 in reaching this point, finding that the ATS’s 
“focus” is on conduct and the location of that conduct.120  
Critically, in the court’s view, the only relevant conduct 
was that which actually constituted, or aided and abetted, a 
law of nations violation.121 In other words, the only way to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality is if a 
law of nations violation occurred on U.S. soil. The court also 
held that a defendant’s U.S. citizenship is completely 
irrelevant to the touch-and-concern inquiry.122 The majority 
framed the touch-and-concern inquiry as the first part of a 
two-part test for displacing the presumption, with the second 
 
115 In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 151 
(2d Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 
(2018). 
116 The court took this opportunity to interpret Kiobel II and the 
presumption against extraterritoriality even though it could not exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction in the case, since the ATS defendants were 
corporations. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 178–79 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
117 Id. at 174–76. 
118 Id. at 182. 
119 See supra note 62 and a longer discussion of Morrison infra Section 
III.C. 
120 Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 188. 
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part being an early evaluation of the merits to determine 
whether a plaintiff had sufficiently pled a true law of nations 
violation.123 
In the case at hand, the court ruled that the complaint 
failed to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.124 
Although the complaint facially appeared to sufficiently 
“touch and concern” the United States, the alleged conduct did 
not itself constitute either intentional or knowing aiding and 
abetting of a law of nations violation, thus failing the second 
prong of the test.125 The fact that two corporations—one being 
a U.S. corporation—undertaking domestic activities to 
knowingly aid a foreign regime’s alleged torture did not rebut 
the presumption illustrates the restrictiveness of the Second 
Circuit’s approach to granting ATS jurisdiction.126 
B. Fourth Circuit: A Flexible, Fact-Based Approach 
The Fourth Circuit has taken a simple approach to 
corporate liability, and the most liberal approach to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed these issues in Al Shimari v. 
CACI Premier Technology, Inc., in which victims of alleged 
abuse from the Abu Ghraib prison incident sued a U.S. 
military contractor for torture, war crimes, and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment, specifically alleging 
actionable behavior by corporate management in the United 
States and by employees in Iraq.127  
 
123 Id. at 186. 
124 Id. at 192. 
125 Id. at 192–94. Chevron and BNP allegedly helped fund the torture 
of the plaintiffs through domestic purchases and financing transactions 
(Chevron) and domestic payments and financing arrangements (BNP). Id. 
at 191.  
126 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed Jesner. 
127 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 521–22 (4th 
Cir. 2014). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s managers ignored 
reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib and attempted to cover it up, that the 
defendant’s site manager reviewed reports raising potential abuse, that said 
manager had daily contact with the corporation in the United States and 
sent weekly reports to the executive team in the United States, and that the 
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By hearing the case, the court implicitly recognized that 
corporations could be liable under the ATS. The only 
published discussion of corporate liability in the litigation 
came on remand three years later, when the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia simply mentioned in a 
footnote that it had decided in an earlier ruling that 
corporations were subject to ATS liability.128 The Court of 
Appeals, however, addressed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the touch-and-concern test at length in 
its decision. The court framed the inquiry as requiring a fact-
based analysis to determine whether a plaintiff’s claim as a 
whole touched and concerned the United States with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption, pointing to the 
Supreme Court’s specific use of the term “claim,” and not 
merely “conduct,” in Kiobel II.129 This would include an 
examination of “all the facts” associated with a claim, 
“including the parties’ identities and their relationship to the 
causes of action.”130 The key consequence of this principle is 
that the court’s inquiry goes beyond mere tortious conduct. In 
other words, the conduct constituting a law of nations 
violation need not occur in the United States for the 
presumption to be displaced, as long as there were sufficient 
connections among the defendant, the alleged violations, and 
the United States. This represents a sharp departure from the 
other circuits. 
 The defendant claimed that the ATS, under Kiobel II, did 
not cover cases where the alleged tortious conduct occurred 
abroad, but the court expressly rejected this argument.131 The 
court reasoned that Kiobel II could not stand for that 
proposition because the concurrence written by Justice Alito 
took that very position and the majority expressly did not 
 
defendant’s vice president traveled regularly to Iraq and knew about the 
company’s operations at Abu Ghraib. Id. at 522. 
128 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 595, 599 
n.4 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
129 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013)). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 528. 
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adopt it.132 Instead, a close examination of all the facts 
associated with a claim could still reveal sufficient 
connections with the United States to rebut the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, even if the law of nations violation 
occurred extraterritorially. In the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ view, “mechanically applying the presumption . . . 
would not advance the purposes of the presumption[,]” which 
include allowing the extraterritorial application of U.S. law in 
those cases where doing so is appropriate.133 In articulating 
its holistic standard for rebutting the presumption, the court 
also downplayed any potential negative foreign policy 
consequences. It pointed out that all defendants in the present 
case were U.S. citizens, so the court would not have to hale 
foreign nationals into the United States.134 It also noted that 
it was not interfering in foreign policy because the political 
branches had made clear that the United States did not 
tolerate torture.135 
In Al Shimari, the court ruled that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality was displaced, and the court thus 
had subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.136 In the 
court’s view, the following facts served to touch and concern 
the United States with sufficient force: the defendant 
corporation and its employees were U.S. citizens; the 
defendant’s contract with the U.S. government was executed 
in the United States and required the defendant’s employees 
to procure security clearances from the U.S. government; the 
defendant’s U.S.-based managers allegedly tacitly approved, 
attempted to cover up, and implicitly encouraged the torture 
of the plaintiffs; and Congress had made clear its intention to 
hold U.S. citizens accountable for torture committed 
abroad.137 While the court did not decide what type or number 
of domestic connections would be sufficient going forward, its 
analysis shows that the Fourth Circuit has adopted a flexible, 
 
132 Id. at 527–28. 
133 Id. at 529. 
134 Id. at 530. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 530–31. 
137 Id. 
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fact-based, and thus a relatively liberal regime for displacing 
the presumption against extraterritoriality under the ATS. 
Early indications are that Jesner will not alter that regime. 
After Jesner, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia rejected the Al Shimari defendants’ argument that 
allowing the litigation to proceed would result in improper 
judicial interference in foreign policy.138 It relied on the Fourth 
Circuit’s reasoning in its 2014 decision referenced above and 
stated that the plaintiffs’ suit was consistent with the ATS’s 
purpose of providing “a federal forum for tort suits by aliens 
against Americans for international law violations.”139 The 
court explicitly distinguished Jesner, reasoning that the 
Court’s concerns there stemmed from the fact that the 
defendant was a foreign corporation, which is not the case in 
Al Shimari.140 The District Court could have read Jesner as 
requiring caution before exercising ATS jurisdiction in 
general. Instead it chose a narrow reading largely cabining 
Jesner’s analysis to foreign corporate defendants, potentially 
signaling that it will take another adverse Supreme Court 
decision for the Fourth Circuit to modify its approach, even as 
other circuits may come to see Jesner differently. This all 
leaves no reason to believe that the Fourth Circuit’s flexible 
ATS regime for U.S. corporations will be affected by Jesner.  
C. Ninth Circuit: A Semi-Restrictive Conduct-Based 
Approach 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a unique approach to 
corporate liability and a semi-restrictive approach to 
displacing the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Regarding the former, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
adopted a norm-by-norm approach in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC. 
Under this view, for each substantive offense raised under the 
ATS, a court must examine international law to determine 
whether that law can hold corporations liable for the specific 
 
138 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 781, 785–
86 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
139 Id. at 785, 787. 
140 Id. at 787–88. 
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offense.141 The court based its analysis on its interpretation of 
Sosa’s footnote 20, and it effectively represents a middle 
approach between Judge Cabranes’s position and Judge 
Leval’s position in Kiobel I. The Ninth Circuit identified three 
distinct categories of would-be violators: state actors, private 
individuals, and private groups. Theoretically, there are law 
of nations violations under which state actors and private 
individuals can be liable, but corporations cannot. The court 
pointed out, though, that there are also substantive 
international law norms that are “universal and absolute[,]” 
meaning they apply to all actors, including corporations.142 
The court also stated that international precedent enforcing a 
norm against corporations need not exist for corporations to 
be liable for that norm under the ATS,143 thus refuting Judge 
Cabranes’s reasoning in Kiobel I. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed these 
principles in Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc. (“Nestle I”), which was 
decided after Kiobel II. 144 In that case, the court clarified its 
view of the sources of law that control the issue: international 
law controls the nature and scope of the substantive norm 
underlying a plaintiff’s claim, while domestic law controls 
specific questions relating to recovery from a corporate 
defendant.145 Applying its approach to the norms at issue in 
these two cases, the court ruled that corporations were liable 
under the ATS for genocide, war crimes,146 and slavery.147 
Regarding the first two, the court found that the applicability 
of the norms of genocide and war crimes turns on the identity 
of victims, meaning all types of perpetrators are cognizable 
 
141 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747–48 (9th Cir. 
2011), judgment vacated, 569 U.S. 945 (2013). 
142 Id. at 759–60. 
143 Id. at 760–61. 
144 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc. (Nestle I), 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
145 Id.  
146 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760, 765.  
147 Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1022. 
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defendants.148 Regarding the latter, the court found that the 
norm behind the prohibition of slavery applies both to state 
and private actors, and that no rule in international law 
exempts corporations from liability.149 While the Ninth 
Circuit has left open the possibility that a norm could apply to 
private individuals but not corporations, these examples 
illustrate that this is unlikely to ever occur, since 
international law generally has no principles expressly 
exempting corporations from being cognizable perpetrators of 
heinous offenses. 
The Nestle I court also briefly touched on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, including the relevance of the 
Morrison test to the touch-and-concern test. In Morrison, the 
Court employed a two-step “focus” test to assess the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.150 The first step asks 
whether there is an indication that a statute is meant to apply 
extraterritorially.151 If there is no such indication, the second 
step asks what the “focus of congressional concern” is for a 
statute and whether that focus is on domestic or 
extraterritorial conduct.152 In the Nestle I court’s view, the 
Morrison “focus” test” was at most “informative precedent” for 
determining how to carry out the Kiobel II touch-and-concern 
test.153 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the 
presumption and ATS at more length in Mujica v. AirScan 
Inc. There, the court seemed to adopt a position somewhere 
between the Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit. While the 
court did not state that a law of nations violation needs to 
occur in the United States to satisfy the touch-and-concern 
test, it did indicate that at least “some of the conduct relevant 
 
148 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 764–765 (noting that Genocide Convention and 
Common Article III to the Geneva Conventions focus “on the specific 
identity of the victims rather than the identity of the perpetrators”). 
149 Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1022. 
150 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265–70 (2010). 
151 Id. at 260–61. 
152 Id. at 266 (quoting Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian 
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153 Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1028. 
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to [the plaintiffs’] claims” does need to occur in the United 
States.”154 The court also implied that a direct connection 
between the U.S. conduct and the violations that occurred 
abroad is necessary.155  
However, the Ninth Circuit changed course later in the 
Nestle litigation in Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (“Nestle II”) and decided 
that the Morrison focus test did apply to ATS claims, thereby 
abrogating the touch-and-concern test.156 It did so as a result 
of RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. There, the 
Court applied the Morrison focus test to the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and stated that 
Kiobel II also required a two-step framework for analyzing 
extraterritoriality.157 The Nestle II court took this to mean 
that it should analyze ATS claims using the Morrison focus 
test going forward. It then described how Kiobel II had already 
answered the first step of the focus test, since the Supreme 
Court there found that nothing in the ATS rebutted the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.158 Next, the Nestle II 
court interpreted the focus-of-the-statute step as asking if 
there was any domestic conduct relevant to the plaintiffs’ ATS 
claims.159 The court found that the defendants’ funding of 
child slavery practices in the Ivory Coast, combined with their 
practice of sending employees from their U.S. headquarters to 
the Ivory Coast to inspect operations and report back, was 
sufficiently “relevant to the ATS’s focus” to satisfy the 
Morrison test.160  
Despite employing a different test, the court’s approach in 
Nestle II was not ultimately dissimilar from Mujica, meaning 
the Ninth Circuit remains somewhere between the Second 
Circuit and Fourth Circuit in terms of restrictiveness. In 
Mujica, the victims of a bombing raid in Colombia accused the 
 
154 Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 595 (9th Cir. 2014). 
155 Id. at 592 n.6. 
156 Doe v. Nestle, S.A. (Nestle II), 906 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 
157 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 
(2016). 
158 Nestle II, 906 F.3d at 1125. 
159 Id. at 1125–26. 
160 Id. at 1126. 
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defendant oil company and defendant security company, both 
of which were U.S. corporations, of helping the Colombian 
military to carry out the raid in order to protect the oil 
company’s Colombian pipeline.161 There were no allegations of 
U.S. conduct other than the plaintiffs’ speculation that the 
defendants concluded a contract in the United States.162 This 
minimal alleged U.S. conduct failed to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.163 In the court’s 
analysis, the plaintiffs’ allegations that the oil company 
allowed the security company and Colombian military to use 
its facility to plan the raid, that several of the security 
company’s employees piloted one of the planes that 
participated in the raid, and that the security company helped 
the Colombian military plan the raid were insufficient to 
displace the presumption.164 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit 
placed a greater emphasis on conduct than in the Fourth 
Circuit, where the court relied on the more tangential facts 
underlying a plaintiff’s claim. Under the Fourth Circuit’s 
more general claim-based approach, the uncredited actions in 
Mujica could be considered as part of the calculus for 
displacing the presumption. That they were irrelevant here 
illustrates the more restrictive nature of the Ninth Circuit’s 
conduct-based approach.165  
D. Eleventh Circuit: A Restrictive, Conduct-Based 
Approach 
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has 
recognized corporate liability without much analysis, whereas 
its semi-restrictive approach to displacing the presumption 
against extraterritoriality approximates the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
161 Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 584–85 (9th Cir. 2014). 
162 Id. at 592. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 585, 592. 
165 It appears that Jesner will not affect the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
to ATS liability for U.S. corporations. In Nestle II, which was decided after 
Jesner, the court expressly stated that Jesner’s holding was limited to 
foreign corporations and it thereby affirmed its holding in Nestle I as applied 
to U.S. corporations. Nestle II, 906 F.3d at 1124. 
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approach. Regarding corporate liability, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals granted jurisdiction under the ATS for a 
torture claim against a corporate defendant in 2005 without 
elaborating on the issue.166 
The Eleventh Circuit developed its test for the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to the ATS 
in Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc. There, the plaintiffs—
Colombian victims of alleged extrajudicial killings, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity carried out by a 
Colombian paramilitary group—sued a U.S. coal mining 
company, its subsidiary, and several corporate officers. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants orchestrated the 
paramilitary’s actions in order to protect their mining 
operations in Colombia.167 The court announced a “fact-
intensive” standard for analyzing the ATS’s presumption: 
“[d]isplacement of the presumption will be warranted if the 
claims have a U.S. focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs 
within the United States.”168 The court elaborated by pointing 
to the importance of locating the conduct that “directly or 
secondarily” resulted in international law violations.169 It also 
required the allegations to meet a “minimum factual 
predicate” to warrant exterritorial application of the ATS.170  
The Eleventh Circuit noted that both a defendant’s U.S. 
citizenship and the “U.S. interests” triggered by a plaintiff’s 
claim (here, the defendants allegedly funding and retaining a 
U.S.-designated terrorist organization) were relevant to the 
“U.S. focus” part of the standard, but also that neither factor 
was sufficient, even in combination, to rebut the 
 
166 See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 
1254 (11th Cir. 2005). On the basis of that case, when the defendant in 
Romero v. Drummond argued several years later that corporations should 
not be liable under the ATS, the court simply stated that it was bound by 
its precedent. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
167 Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 579–80 (11th Cir. 2015). 
168 Id. at 592. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 593 (quoting Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229 (11th 
Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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presumption.171 This reveals that while the standard does not 
on its face appear to privilege the “adequate relevant conduct” 
prong, in reality, that prong requires more than the “U.S. 
focus” prong.172 To wit, the court labeled the U.S. conduct 
inquiry “key” and intimated that it represents a stricter 
test.173 
The court appeared to soften that stance elsewhere in its 
opinion, stating that the conduct factor was “weighty but not 
dispositive”174 and holding that the place of mere “decision-
making” could factor into the conduct inquiry.175 However, the 
court’s analysis and decision reinforce the idea that the 
conduct inquiry represents a high bar. It seemed to imply that 
the inquiry called for a balancing test, not a sufficiency test. 
While acknowledging that the defendants made key decisions 
in the United States, this fact did not “outweigh” the alleged  
extraterritorial conduct, including the actual funding of the 
paramilitary group and the planning of the operation.176 
Notably, the court acknowledged one such decision: that the 
defendant’s president “agreed to” the plan to murder the 
victims of the operation.177 However, the court stated that 
“mere consent” to international law violations did not suffice 
as conduct to displace the presumption because it was not 
“directed at” the international law violations.178 
The court’s opinion is largely unclear regarding what will 
suffice to displace the presumption going forward, but it does 
indicate that plaintiffs will face a high bar. If the inquiry 
indeed involves a balancing of U.S. conduct and 
extraterritorial conduct, few claims are likely to succeed, 
given that even in ATS cases where significant U.S. conduct 
is alleged, there is likely to be even greater extraterritorial 
 
171 Id. at 595–97. 
172 Id. at 592. 
173 Id. at 597. 
174 Id. at 593 n.24. 
175 Id. at 597. 
176 Id. at 598. 
177 Id. at 599. 
178 Id. at 599–600. 
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conduct alleged. 179 Even if there is no balancing, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach still appears restrictive. While the “U.S. 
focus” portion of the circuit’s standard aligns with the more 
lenient Fourth Circuit approach, the primacy of the “conduct” 
portion indicates that the Eleventh Circuit is, in practice, 
aligned with the less forgiving Ninth Circuit approach. In fact, 
the Eleventh Circuit’s approach appears even more 
restrictive, considering that, unlike Mujica, there was 
cognizable U.S. conduct in Drummond and the court still 
deemed it insufficient. 180 However, this is still less restrictive 
than the Second Circuit, which requires the actual law of 
nations violation to occur in the United States.181 
E. D.C. Circuit: Hinting at a Semi-Permissive Approach 
The D.C. Circuit has held that corporations are 
categorically liable under the ATS, whereas its approach to 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is not entirely 
clear but seems more liberal than restrictive. The D.C. Circuit 
ruled on the former issue in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (“Exxon 
I”), where the court’s analysis of corporate liability tracks that 
of Judge Leval in Kiobel I. The court drew a distinction 
between the substantive norms that support causes of action 
under the ATS and the remedies for violation of those norms. 
It explained that courts must refer to federal common law, 
which supports corporate liability, for remedial questions, 
because such questions are outside the scope of customary 
international law.182 The court also looked to the context of the 
 
179 See Fox & Goze, supra note 5, at 45 (describing the two classes of 
modern ATS cases, both of which impliedly involve significant 
extraterritorial conduct).  
180 See Doe, 782 F.3d at 597–98; Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 
592 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The allegations that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims 
exclusively concern conduct that occurred in Colombia.”).  
181 As in the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
not yet addressed Jesner. 
182 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). While the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals later vacated this judgment, the opinion remains relevant as the 
only occasion on which the court has analyzed corporate liability.  
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ATS’s enactment. Congress passed the ATS to help the United 
States avoid foreign entanglements resulting from aliens 
lacking a remedy for torts committed against them by U.S. 
citizens. It would not make sense for Congress to risk any 
entanglements by keeping corporations immune from such 
suits, especially since corporate liability was a recognized 
principle in tort law at that time.183  
Regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia addressed it in the 
same litigation on remand three years later (“Exxon II”). 
Although the court’s discussion cannot be considered 
authoritative since the Court of Appeals has not endorsed it, 
it stands as the only example to date of this circuit taking on 
the issue. The case involved allegations made by Indonesian 
nationals that Indonesian soldiers, hired by the four 
defendant corporations to protect their natural gas field, 
inflicted severe injuries on the plaintiffs, some of which 
resulted in deaths. The plaintiffs accused the defendants, 
several of which were U.S. corporations, of providing material 
support to the soldiers.184 The court examined how the Second 
Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit had handled the 
presumption and the touch-and-concern test and ultimately 
concluded based on those examples that a defendant’s U.S. 
citizenship alone could not displace the presumption but that 
the presumption could be displaced if plaintiffs alleged 
sufficient U.S.-based conduct.185  
The court was clear that if the conduct itself constituted a 
law of nations violation, that would suffice to displace the 
 
183 See id. at 43–47 (discussing the legislative history behind the ATS). 
Perhaps because the Exxon I defendant relied on Kiobel I, much of the Exxon 
I court’s reasoning paralleled that of Judge Leval in Kiobel I, as did the 
Exxon I court’s conclusion. The court explained that Kiobel I incorrectly 
concluded that international law did not recognize corporate liability for 
international law violations, that U.S. domestic law controlled the issue, 
and that, adhering to federal common law principles, corporations were 
categorically liable under the ATS. Id. at 50–51, 57. 
184 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 83–84 (D.D.C. 2014). 
185 Id. at 95–96. 
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presumption.186 However, it did not shed much light on what 
conduct below that marker would suffice. Despite this, the 
court’s evaluation of certain conduct in the decision may be 
instructive.  The plaintiffs alleged that one of the defendants 
provided material and monetary support to the Indonesian 
security force, but it was unclear if that support came from 
the United States.187 The opinion seems to imply that, if said 
support did come from the United States, this could weigh 
toward displacing the presumption. 188 This would potentially 
align the D.C. Circuit with the Ninth Circuit, which requires 
some relevant U.S. conduct under Mujica and Nestle II.189
 
186 Id. at 95 (stating that “when plaintiffs allege U.S. based conduct 
itself constituting a violation of the ATS, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is no obstacle to consideration of ATS claims”).  
187 Id. at 96. 
188 See id. The court specifically identified this conduct, stated that the 
plaintiffs neglected to say whether it occurred in the United States, and 
then decided to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. It follows from 
this that the conduct could be relevant to the presumption analysis if it 
indeed occurred in the United States. 
189 Like in the Ninth Circuit, it appears that Jesner will not affect the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach to ATS liability for U.S. 
corporations, though this is less clear than in the Ninth Circuit. In Kaplan 
v. Central Bank of the Republic of Iran, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
specifically and repeatedly referred to Jesner as addressing only foreign 
corporate liability, albeit while discussing an ancillary issue. Kaplan v. 
Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 515–16 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). However, a recent D.C. District Court decision in the Exxon litigation 
has clouded the picture. Despite the Court of Appeals’ assertion that Jesner 
addressed only foreign corporate liability, the District Court concluded that 
it was appropriate to re-examine the defendant U.S. corporation’s ATS 
liability because of Jesner. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3d 76, 
84–85 (D.D.C. 2019). The court analyzed the defendant’s liability using two 
separate lines of inquiry, without stating which line was determinative: one 
based on the portion of Jesner that received five votes, and one based on the 
Jesner plurality’s approach. Id. at 85. Under the first line of inquiry, the 
court declined to recognize U.S. corporate liability because the present case 
had caused significant diplomatic strife, as evidenced by various filings from 
the Executive Branch and Indonesia. Id. at 85–87. Under the second line of 
inquiry, the court examined the two-part test that Sosa ostensibly 
mandated. At the first step, the court found that corporations could not be 
liable under the ATS because corporate liability is not a specific, universal, 
and obligatory norm of international law. Id. at 87–91. At the second step, 
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 The above discussion illustrates the circuits’ varying 
approaches to corporate liability under the ATS and the 
requirements for rebutting the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as applied to the ATS. It also reveals that, 
among those circuits that have addressed Jesner, courts are 
largely hewing to Jesner’s narrow holding that foreign 
corporations are not liable under the ATS and are not using 
Jesner as a reason to alter their approaches to U.S. 
corporations. Going forward, this development indicates that 
the circuits will likely still be using the analytical regimes 
described above in ATS cases involving U.S. corporate 
defendants. 
  
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE 
FOURTH CIRCUIT’S REGIME FOR CORPORATE 
ATS LIABILITY 
The Fourth Circuit’s approach to U.S. corporate liability 
and the presumption against extraterritoriality under the 
ATS should be adopted by the Supreme Court. Legal 
considerations, policy considerations, and foreign relations 
considerations all argue for the widest possible application of 
the ATS to corporations. In this light, the Fourth Circuit’s 
approach is ideal because it involves the most liberal and 
flexible regime190 for deciding when claims against U.S. 
corporations should overcome the presumption, while 
simultaneously allowing for sufficient safeguards to prevent 
the ATS’s overapplication.191 Unlike the other circuits, the 
 
the court found that allowing the case to proceed would not be a proper 
exercise of judicial discretion due to foreign policy and separation of powers 
concerns. Id. at 91–93. Should the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adopt 
either of these approaches, the circuit’s ATS regime would become much 
more restrictive, especially if it adopts the second line of inquiry.  
190 See Note, supra note 62, at 1919. 
191 Some have argued for an even more forgiving regime for corporate 
ATS liability. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 127 
(2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing for ATS jurisdiction when the 
alleged tort occurs on U.S. soil, the defendant is a U.S. national, or the 
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important U.S. 
6_2019.3_ESTES (DO NOT DELTE) 12/26/2019  12:00 AM 
1070 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
Fourth Circuit’s regime calls for examining a plaintiff’s claim 
in its entirety and does not require a certain amount or type 
of U.S. conduct. This framework is successful because it sets 
a realistic bar for plaintiffs to meet the touch-and-concern 
requirement, ensuring that the presumption remains merely 
a “presumption,” and not a tool that courts and corporations 
use to mechanically dismiss claims involving allegations of 
heinous conduct. Yet the framework also provides sufficient 
flexibility for courts to dismiss claims that should not rebut 
the presumption.  
Holding U.S. corporations liable in general comports with 
both the original understanding of the ATS,192 which the 
Supreme Court and federal courts have relied on in their ATS 
jurisprudence,193 and the modern conception of international 
law.194 If federal common law provides the rule of decision, 
U.S. corporate liability under the ATS clearly should exist, 
and even if customary international law provides the rule of 
decision, U.S. corporate liability still may be appropriate 
given the strong argument that international law now 
recognizes corporate liability for human rights violations. 195 
Adopting the most flexible regime possible for corporate ATS 
liability will ensure the continued propagation of the 
important message that the United States will hold its 
businesses accountable for their egregious conduct and will 
provide victims of any abuses the opportunity to receive 
justice and compensation. Doing so could even have positive 
 
interest); Doyle, supra note 75, at 468 (proposing test where defendant’s 
U.S. nationality would be sufficient to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality).  
192 Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 476–77 (discussing leading 
18th-century treatise and explaining how states were obligated to provide 
redress for harms their nationals committed against foreign citizens); Doe 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 45–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. 
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining how corporate liability was a recognized 
principle of tort law at time of ATS’s enactment).  
193 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–25 (2004). 
194 See CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 195–96; Jan Wouters & Leen 
Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 264–66 (2008).  
195 See CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 251. 
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effects on the U.S. business community in terms of 
encouraging more robust oversight.196 Finally, using the 
Fourth Circuit’s regime for U.S. corporate liability and the 
presumption will not result in foreign entanglements or the 
judiciary’s improper involvement in foreign affairs. In fact, the 
U.S. judiciary’s failure to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. 
corporations under the ATS could cause strife with foreign 
countries. This is the opposite of what Congress intended in 
passing the statute.197 Examining how corporate liability for 
human rights abuses is being handled elsewhere in the world 
bolsters this last point. 
A. Corporate Liability is Appropriate Given the 
Relevant Legal Considerations 
The inquiry into corporate liability under the ATS has 
largely been defined by the differing opinions written by 
Judge Cabranes (arguing against corporate liability because 
customary international law controlled the issue) and Judge 
Leval (arguing for corporate liability because U.S. domestic 
law controlled the issue) in Kiobel I.198 Justice Kennedy 
confirmed as much, without settling the issue, in his plurality 
opinion in Jesner.199 While it would be desirable for the 
Supreme Court to rule definitively on the issue, in reality, 
either viewpoint leads to the conclusion that U.S. corporations 
should be liable under the ATS. There is strong support for 
Judge Leval’s position that customary international law 
leaves the question of corporate liability to U.S. domestic law 
because it is a matter of remedy or enforcement. Customary 
international law generally does not establish ways for 
redress of international law violations.200 Instead, the law of 
nations and customary international law leave most remedial 
 
196 See Martin, supra note 6, at 991–92. 
197 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397 (2018) (discussing 
the legislative history of the ATS). 
198 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
199 See discussion supra Section II.D.2. 
200 Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability 
in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 297–98 (2009). 
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issues, including whether corporate liability is available, to 
the discretion of individual states.201 The Supreme Court 
appeared to agree in Sosa, confirming that federal courts can 
create private liability, as a matter of federal common law.202 
It follows that federal courts must refer to U.S. domestic law 
to answer the question of whether corporations are liable 
under the ATS, and federal common law clearly recognizes 
corporate liability.203 
However, even if customary international law governs 
corporate liability, there is strong reason to find that Judge 
Cabranes’s analysis was faulty and that international practice 
does support corporate liability. Judge Cabranes looked to 
sources such as international tribunals and international 
treaties in determining that corporations were not subjects of 
international law and that there was no international law 
norm of corporate liability.204 For example, he pointed to the 
lack of corporate liability at the post-World War II Nuremberg 
trials, and the lack of corporate liability in the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court.205 Nuremberg, 
though, is better read as representing a step toward corporate 
liability. The trials represented an expansion of liability for 
human rights abuses from nations to private actors generally, 
and corporations there were still implicated in wrongdoing, 
leading to punishment such as the dissolution of I.G. Farben 
and criminal liability for the employees of implicated 
corporations.206 These developments illustrate the shift in the 
international community toward recognizing corporate 
responsibility for wrongdoing and reveal that the shift began 
a significant time ago.207 Thus, citing the Nuremberg trials to 
 
201 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
202 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (emphasis 
added). 
203 Doe, 654 F.3d at 57. 
204 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 132–41, 145 (2d 
Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
205 Id. at 133–37. 
206 Kolieb, supra note 104, at 588–594. 
207 Id. at 592. 
6_2019.3_ESTES (DO NOT DELETE) 12/26/2019  12:00 AM 
No. 3:1031] MAY THE FOURTH BE WITH YOU 1073 
immunize corporations from international liability goes 
against what the trials stand for in the evolution of 
international practice.208 Regarding the Rome Statute, while 
a proposal to include corporate liability was rejected, this was 
not due to “insuperable objections of principle,” but rather 
because of “technical complexities” and “time constraints 
. . . .”209 Several countries, in fact, have allowed for corporate 
liability in incorporating the Rome Statute into their domestic 
law, including Australia, Canada, and France.210 This weighs 
against the Rome Statute serving as evidence that corporate 
liability is not recognized internationally. 
All told, there is a growing sense internationally that 
corporations are subjects of international law, with attendant 
obligations.211 This is especially the case when it comes to 
human rights compliance.212 There are many examples of 
treaties today that demand action against corporations (and 
that leave actual enforcement against corporations to 
signatory states, which essentially mimics the ATS regime).213 
This leads to the conclusion that: 
[T]here is certainly room today to reverse the 
assumption that corporations have absolutely no 
liability under general international law. Although 
the jurisdictional possibilities are limited under 
existing international tribunals, where national law 
allows for claims based on violations of international 
law, it is becoming clear that international law 
obligates non-state actors.214 
The last part of the above passage describes the operation 
of the U.S. ATS regime. Additionally, even in the absence of a 
specific provision in a human rights treaty, international law 
 
208 Id. at 595. 
209 Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for 
Human Rights Violations in European Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 232 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
210 Kolieb, supra note 104, at 600. 
211 CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 195. 
212 Wouters & Chanet, supra note 194, at 264–66. 
213 See CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 247–51. 
214 Id. at 251. 
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effectively imposes obligations on corporations through the 
obligations imposed on states that fail to redress their 
corporations’ violations.215 The broadest view of this would 
extend states’ obligations to regulating their corporations’ 
activity wherever it takes place, including 
extraterritorially.216 This all points to a conclusion that 
corporate liability has indeed ripened into a norm of 
customary international law, or at the very least that 
customary international law recognizes corporate liability 
much more than Judge Cabranes indicated in Kiobel I. Even 
under his analytical framework, there is a strong argument 
today for U.S. corporate liability for law of nations violations. 
Thus, whether one views federal common law or customary 
international law as supplying the rule of decision for 
corporate liability, the outcome is the same: it is appropriate 
to hold U.S. corporations liable under the ATS, as the Fourth 
Circuit does. Further, the Fourth Circuit’s liberal regime for 
displacing the presumption against extraterritoriality best 
captures the scope of the ATS as it was originally understood. 
Modern ATS jurisprudence pre-Jesner was overbroad in 
allowing claims against foreign defendants, including foreign 
corporations, because the ATS was intended to redress only 
harms caused by U.S. citizens or nationals.217 Meanwhile, the 
jurisprudence was underinclusive in Sosa’s limiting of 
substantive claims to universally accepted international law 
norms, because the ATS was intended to cover any intentional 
tort committed by a private U.S. citizen against an alien.218 
The overbroadness concern is irrelevant to U.S. corporate 
liability, and adopting the most forgiving regime for 
displacing the presumption helps counteract the narrowing of 
ATS liability that has occurred in modern times. Of all the 
circuits, the Fourth Circuit’s approach is as close as possible 
to the original understanding of the ATS. This is critical, since 
 
215 De Schutter, supra note 209, at 234–35. While this does not 
constitute direct corporate liability, it is still evidence of international law’s 
increasing recognition that corporate wrongdoing merits civil redress.  
216 Id. at 235. 
217 Bellia, Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 454. 
218 Id. at 542–43. 
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modern courts have sought to analyze the ATS through its 
original understanding. In total, then, applying the Fourth 
Circuit’s ATS regime to U.S. corporations is fully compatible 
with the legal principles already established by ATS 
jurisprudence. 
B. The Fourth Circuit’s ATS Regime Best 
Accommodates All Stakeholders  
Adopting the Fourth Circuit’s flexible regime for displacing 
the presumption against extraterritoriality and holding U.S. 
corporations liable under the ATS will best address the 
interests of businesses, plaintiffs, and others affected by 
possible ATS cases. Naturally, imposing the regime that is 
strictest on ATS defendants raises concerns about harmful 
effects on U.S. businesses. It may be argued, too, that U.S. 
businesses could be discouraged from investing or operating 
in other countries if they can face potentially greater liability 
for their actions abroad. However, imposing such a regime 
should only discourage the type of heinous, unconscionable 
behavior that gives rise to ATS claims. If some U.S. businesses 
feel that they cannot aid a country’s economy without de facto 
immunity from human rights liability, the law should serve to 
discourage such businesses. Society would be better off 
forgoing their investment if it also means forgoing their 
participation in the commission of universally condemned 
crimes. 
The Fourth Circuit’s flexible regime also comports with the 
current climate surrounding corporations and human rights: 
Businesses are expected to respect human rights, even in the 
absence of government regulation,219 meaning allowing for the 
widest possible ATS liability is not necessarily out of sync with 
their existing social and legal burdens. The business lobby 
itself has begun to acknowledge that corporations must be 
accountable for abuses that occur in developing countries,220 
which is where most modern ATS claims against corporations 
 
219 Martin, supra note 6, at 991 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220 Id. at 961. 
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are derived. 221 This is at least partly evidenced by businesses 
voluntarily agreeing to road-test the United Nations’ Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 
when they were first adopted in 2003.222 
As corporations increasingly profess their commitment to 
protecting human rights, they are increasingly unable to 
explain away abuses that they commit due to their failure to 
monitor their own operations.223 It follows that imposition of 
ATS liability, even in the most plaintiff-friendly form, is 
increasingly justifiable. Finally, greater scrutiny of 
corporations’ human rights practices could also prove 
beneficial for corporations themselves. Corporate human 
rights abuses often trigger significant backlash from the 
public, which could lead shareholders and investors to 
withdraw from the offending organizations.224 Greater ATS 
liability, and its potential deterrent effect on corporate 
misbehavior, could lead to a reduction in human rights 
abuses, thereby preventing shareholder and investor 
departures.   
In terms of legal certainty, because all circuits except the 
Second Circuit have recognized corporate ATS liability, U.S. 
corporations are already on notice that they are subject to 
liability for their human rights-related behavior.225 Even so, 
U.S. corporations continue to enjoy meaningful liability 
safeguards. First, even with the ATS’s expansion in the 
modern era, only a limited number of substantive offenses 
remain actionable under the statute.226 Second, businesses 
 
221 See Fox & Goze, supra note 5, at 45 (generally describing modern 
ATS claims against corporations as involving business activities in 
developing countries).  
222 David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 907 (2003). 
223 Martin, supra note 6, at 998. 
224 Id. at 963–64; see also Wouters & Chanet, supra note 194, at 269. 
225 Even were this not the case, the offenses cognizable under the ATS 
are so egregious that corporations should not need such notice in order to 
refrain from unconscionable behavior. 
226 CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 253. 
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remain protected by the common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. By invoking forum non conveniens, a federal court 
may dismiss a suit at its discretion if an adequate alternative 
forum is available and the balance of relevant private and 
public interests favors dismissal.227 Given the significant 
amount of extraterritorial conduct that ATS cases involve and 
the possible availability of fora where said conduct occurs, 
forum non conveniens would seem to be a very meaningful 
safeguard for ATS defendants.228 Third, as the Supreme Court 
did in Jesner, any federal court would be able to dismiss a case 
if it happened to implicate serious foreign relations concerns. 
Lastly, of course, there is the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. While the Fourth Circuit’s regime is the 
most liberal of the circuits when it comes to displacing the 
presumption, it still carries plenty of flexibility to decline 
jurisdiction whenever a claim does not sufficiently touch and 
concern the United States. With all these safeguards in place, 
there should be no concern that adopting the Fourth Circuit’s 
ATS regime will unduly burden U.S. businesses. 
Incorporating the most liberal possible ATS regime will 
also ensure that victims of human rights abuses committed by 
U.S. corporations have access to meaningful civil recourse. 
The ATS has developed into a notable tool for providing 
redress for human rights abuses, and alien plaintiffs should 
continue to be able to rely on it. The ATS is often the only 
avenue available for alien plaintiffs due to the inadequacy of 
their own countries’ legal systems, or local authorities’ failure 
to penalize U.S. corporations over fears of losing much-needed 
investment.229 Plaintiffs also cannot rely on corporate self-
governance alone for protection from human rights abuses. 
Not all corporations will sufficiently modify their behavior to 
prevent abuses because it is not necessarily profitable to do 
 
227 Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 424 (2018); see 
also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
228 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 139 (2013) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing a preferred jurisdictional understanding 
of the ATS which would rely on courts to invoke forum non conveniens to 
decline jurisdiction when appropriate). 
229 CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 238. 
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so,230 and the corporate social responsibility movement, which 
encourages businesses to adopt socially conscious practices, is 
not a proper solution because it is entirely voluntary.231 It also 
does not appear that state courts would provide sufficient 
relief as an alternative option. 232 Nor would it be sufficient for 
plaintiffs to sue officers, directors, or employees of U.S. 
corporations in their individual capacities, as the offenses 
cognizable under the ATS—e.g., genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity—necessarily contemplate collective 
action.233 
Overall, the ATS’s history and Jesner reinforce the need for 
a significant accountability mechanism.234 Beyond that, they 
reinforce the need for a flexible, federal, legal framework 
holding corporations as a whole, and not their individual 
agents, liable. The ATS, and the Fourth Circuit’s regime 
specifically, meets this standard without unduly harming U.S. 
businesses. 
C. Adopting the Fourth Circuit’s Regime Will Not 
Inflame Foreign Tensions 
In Jesner, the Supreme Court based its ruling that foreign 
corporations could not be liable under the ATS on the principle 
that judicial caution mandates abstention from hearing cases 
that raise foreign policy problems.235 However, imposing ATS 
liability on U.S. corporations will not cause the foreign 
relations issues that are associated with imposing liability on 
foreign corporations or persons. It is generally understood 
that nations have prescriptive jurisdiction over their 
nationals’ activities whether they occur within national 
 
230 Wouters & Chanet, supra note 194, at 281 (“[I]t has not been proven 
that corporate responsibility will generally make a company more 
profitable. Thus . . . an appropriate regulatory framework is needed.”). 
231 Joe Lodico, Note, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 30 J. L. & COM. 117, 133 (2012). 
232 Doyle, supra note 75, at 453–54. 
233 Kolieb, supra note 104, at 575. 
234 Over 250 firms have been implicated in egregious conduct as part of 
ATS suits. Doyle, supra note 75, at 450–51. 
235 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405–07 (2018). 
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territory or outside it.236 In the modern era, such jurisdiction 
includes a nation’s corporations.237 This comports with the 
obligations imposed on nations that fail to redress their 
corporations’ violations: the broadest view in international 
law today holds that said obligations encompass regulating 
corporations’ activities wherever they take place.238 The 
European Commission has agreed with the above 
jurisdictional stance, supporting the United States’ ability to 
establish ATS jurisdiction for all torts in violation of the law 
of nations when a U.S. national is a defendant.239 This 
indicates that other nations will not protest the United States’ 
decision to establish jurisdiction over U.S. corporations under 
the ATS in the same way that they could protest the United 
States establishing jurisdiction over their corporations. 
Haling U.S. businesses into U.S. courts should thus represent 
an uncontroversial practice and a far cry from haling foreign 
businesses into U.S. courts, even when extraterritorial 
conduct is involved. With ATS liability extending only to U.S. 
corporations, other countries are unlikely to retaliate against 
ATS litigation by attempting to bring U.S. parties into their 
courts, thereby allaying a specific concern that Justice 
Kennedy pointed to in Jesner as cautioning against corporate 
liability.240 
There is also no reason to believe that the political 
branches, to which the judiciary is expected to defer when 
cases could raise sensitive foreign relations concerns, would 
take issue with federal courts continuing to exercise ATS 
jurisdiction over U.S. corporations. Congress expressly 
contemplated international issues in enacting the ATS, as the 
 
236 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 (1987). This 
also comports with the original understanding of the ATS. Under the law of 
nations, a nation-state was responsible for the harms of its citizens no 
matter where the harm occurred. Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 13, at 473. 
237 Ramsey, supra note 200, at 292–93. 
238 De Schutter, supra note 209, at 233–35 (emphasis added). 
239 Brief for the European Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03–339), 
2004 WL 177036 at *6.  
240 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1405–07. 
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statute implicates the law of nations and requires  alien 
plaintiffs.241 That the political branches have chosen not to 
amend the ATS in any meaningful way since 1789, despite the 
many ATS cases that involved foreign defendants and foreign 
conduct, signals their tacit approval of the previous ATS 
regime, at the very least. Given that, the branches have scant 
reason to disapprove of courts continuing to hold U.S. 
corporations liable. As evidence of this, the Executive Branch, 
under two different administrations of differing party 
affiliation, expressed its support for corporate liability in both 
Kiobel II and Jesner.242 In any event, under Sosa, the extent 
of courts’ deference to the political branches over foreign 
relations implications should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.243 Thus, even under the Fourth Circuit’s liberal regime, 
courts can continue to expressly recognize U.S. corporate 
liability while retaining the option to defer to the political 
branches and dismiss a case when doing so is warranted. 
The argument for declining to exercise ATS jurisdiction 
because of a desire to avoid foreign entanglements falls flat 
when the category of corporate defendants is limited to U.S. 
corporations. If anything, failing to hold U.S. corporations 
liable going forward could cause tensions with foreign 
countries where U.S. businesses operate. It is easy to imagine 
a country becoming upset because a U.S. corporation inflicted 
serious human rights abuses on its nationals but a U.S. 
federal court then refused to hear a subsequent ATS suit 
against the corporation.244 This would be a perverse result 
under the ATS, given that its legislative purpose was to help 
avoid strife between the United States and foreign powers.245 
Even if such scenarios do not occur, the larger point is that the 
 
241 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)). 
242 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
243 CLAPHAM, supra note 52, at 445. 
244 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding 
that U.S. corporate defendant conducting human experimentation abroad 
without obtaining consent had the potential to cause “substantial anti-
American animus and hostility”). 
245 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115–17 (2013). 
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converse—foreign countries becoming upset because a court 
does exercise ATS jurisdiction—is not a serious concern when 
U.S. corporations are defendants. As long as the ATS retains 
the force of law, then, it would be inappropriate for courts to 
foreclose ATS jurisdiction over U.S. corporations due to 
foreign policy concerns. 
An examination of how certain parts of the international 
community are viewing the intersection of business and 
human rights further illustrates that foreign countries are 
unlikely to protest a relaxed ATS regime focused only on U.S. 
corporations. The United Nations, advised by Professor John 
Ruggie, has issued Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, which “have received widespread 
commendation and acceptance by stakeholders, including 
national governments, civil society, and businesses 
themselves.”246 Additionally, while the EU has not yet passed 
similar legislation, the European Parliament has long 
envisioned a regulatory mechanism for corporate social 
responsibility that imposes civil liability on corporations 
domiciled in the EU;247 in other words, a system analogous to 
U.S. corporations being liable under the ATS. But even 
without such a mechanism, the EU’s general jurisdiction rules 
themselves seem to allow for ATS-like suits. Under the 
Brussels I Regulation, EU Member State courts have 
jurisdiction to hear civil claims against EU-based corporations 
even when the plaintiff is not domiciled in the EU and the 
injuries occurred outside the EU.248 In fact, this jurisdictional 
regime is more plaintiff-friendly than the ATS in multiple 
 
246 Doyle, supra note 75, at 449. 
247 Wouters & Chanet, supra note 194, at 302. 
248 See Case C-412/98, Grp. Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. 
Ins. Co. (UGIC), 2000 E.C.R. I-5925 (ruling that Brussels I Regulation’s 
mandatory jurisdictional rules applied when a defendant has a domicile or 
seat in a member state and the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member state); 
see also Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 
(ruling that forum non conveniens will not bar adjudication under Brussels 
I Regulation). While these cases did not address corporate defendants 
specifically, their rulings still apply to such defendants. For further 
analysis, see Wouters & Chanet, supra note 194, at 294–303. 
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ways.249 Finally, in a different context, some governments are 
now linking companies’ export credit guarantees to the 
potential human rights impacts of a company’s specific 
project.250 While it cannot be said that the rest of the world is 
rushing to enact corporate liability regimes similar to the 
ATS, the growing international trend toward nations holding 
corporations accountable for human rights abuses 
nevertheless indicates that the global community would take 
no issue with U.S. courts imposing ATS liability on U.S. 
corporations. Adopting the Fourth Circuit’s flexible, fact-
based ATS framework would re-align the United States with 
the global trend, with nary a hint of the foreign policy 
concerns central to Jesner. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ATS has had a rollercoaster of an existence. From 
serving a critical function for a young, vulnerable nation, to 
disappearing into irrelevance, to being revived with an 
entirely modern sheen, to now being slowly pushed aside 
again, the statute has been defined by instability more than 
anything else. The Supreme Court did little to curb this in 
Jesner. While the Court provided certainty in terms of 
removing foreign corporations from the ATS’s ambit, the 
ruling only raised more uncertainty about the ATS’s viability 
going forward. 
While some would welcome the ATS receding into the 
background again, the reality that the law has served a 
momentous function for scores of plaintiffs cannot be brushed 
aside. Victims of the most unimaginable horrors that human 
society is capable of inflicting have been able to achieve some 
sense of justice through the ATS. The importance of that 
cannot be overstated, and unless or until the statute is 
amended or repealed, courts should feel duty-bound to 
maintain its vitality, especially when it comes to corporations, 
which are the most significant type of ATS defendant today. 
 
249 Wouters & Chanet, supra note 194, at 301–02. 
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To that end, adopting the Fourth Circuit’s flexible, all-
encompassing test for overcoming the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as it regards U.S. corporate defendants is 
the best way forward for the Supreme Court in its ATS 
jurisprudence. The near-unanimity among the circuits as to 
whether corporations can be liable under the statute should 
essentially settle that issue, but even the Second Circuit’s 
analytical lens now supports corporate ATS liability. 
Additionally, applying the most liberal possible regime for 
U.S. corporate liability best comports with the ATS’s original 
understanding, which envisioned a far wider range of 
actionable conduct than is currently recognized under the 
ATS. The Fourth Circuit approach does no damage to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, which, despite how 
other circuits have interpreted Kiobel II, does not require a 
significant amount of U.S. conduct in order to be displaced 
under the touch-and-concern test. Further, the approach is 
hardly unfair to businesses, which are already expected to 
respect human rights and which still have many built-in 
advantages in ATS suits, and it simultaneously provides the 
best avenue to justice and compensation for plaintiffs injured 
by egregious U.S. corporate misconduct. Most importantly 
given Jesner, holding U.S. corporations liable under the 
Fourth Circuit’s approach fails to raise foreign relations issues 
of any legitimate magnitude. 
Congress enacted the ATS with an eye toward stable 
international relations and commerce, and it will continue to 
be defined by those concerns, with U.S. corporations now at 
the forefront. While uncertainty, as ever, shrouds the statute 
in the wake of Jesner, the Fourth Circuit has charted an ideal 
path for the ATS’s future. 
 
